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WHO WILL REMEMBER THE CHILDREN? THE INTERNATIONAL HUMAN
RIGHTS MOVEMENT AND JUVENILE JUSTICE IN AFRICA
FAISAL BHABHA* & CRISTINA CANDEA**
Abstract
Our goal in this paper is two-fold: we seek to evaluate the development of juvenile justice in
Africa by making use of a thorough and ethical method of analysis. We begin with a contextual
explanation of the children’s rights movement as it has developed on the continent. We then
reframe David Kennedy’s ten-item critique of the international human rights movement into
three broad categories. Using these categories, we evaluate the development of juvenile justice
in sub-Saharan Africa as it has arisen out of the children’s rights movement.
I. NO INTERNATIONAL TREATY has been as universally lauded as the United Nations
Convention on the Rights of the Child, 1989 (the “CRC”).1 It is the most quickly adopted and
most widely ratified international human rights treaty in the history of the United Nations
(every country in the world, except for the United States, has ratified it2). The CRC creates the
impetus to require adults and the state to ensure the participation and protection of children in
private and public life. It also provides for their special treatment when children come into
conflict with the law.3 In many countries, the creation of separate juvenile justice laws and
institutions was justified by drawing on the recommendations of the CRC. While the CRC has
accomplished near universal agreement on the importance of children’s rights, it has not been
fully implemented in all countries. Among other things, ratification requires that a country draft
and incorporate legislation that realizes the goals of the Convention. The push for this kind of
law reform can contribute to accomplishing many goals, but more law does not necessarily
mean more justice. In this article, we explore the ways in which the CRC has both driven and
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Convention on the Rights of the Child, 20 November 1989, 1577 UNTS 3 (entered into force 2 September 1990)
[CRC].
2
Sarah Mehta, “There’s Only One Country That Hasn’t Ratified the Convention on Children's Rights: US”, (20
November 2015) American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) (blog), online: <www.aclu.org/blog/speakfreely/theres-only-one-country-hasnt-ratified-convention-childrens-rights-us>.
3
CRC, supra note 1, arts 37, 40.
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obstructed the development of juvenile justice in sub-Saharan Africa. We offer a critical
assessment, which casts doubt on the definitions of success implicit in all law reform initiatives.
The growth of a children’s rights movement in Africa in the 1990s provides a valuable
case study to illuminate how juvenile justice has operated on the continent since the adoption
of relevant international human rights standards. It can also provide a lens for evaluating the
ways in which the international children’s rights movement has helped or failed children
engaged in the criminal justice systems of various African countries. The 1990s were a time of
constitutional renewal and innovation in much of the African continent.4 In addition to the
CRC, there was a united effort on the continent to adopt a legal instrument for children’s rights
that would better reflect the particular orientations, priorities, and systems of ordering that were
present in Africa at the time.5 The outcome was the African Charter on Rights and Welfare of
the Child, (the “ACRWC”), adopted in 1990 just one year after the CRC. Through the last
decade of the last millennium, it became apparent that the voices of children’s rights advocates
would no longer be dismissed by the countries of Africa.6
The ACRWC and the CRC have not been equally embraced by African states.
Somewhat surprisingly, the regional ACRWC has been more reluctantly ratified than the CRC.
There are numerous potential explanations for this. Some observers claim that the ACRWC
demands more of the ratifying states and is thus more costly politically.7 Others suggest that
ratifying the CRC might just “look better” to the international community,8 while (regardless
of the merits of its contents) there are few incentives for embracing the ACRWC.

Julia Sloth-Nielsen, ed, Children’s Rights in Africa: A Legal Perspective (Cape Town: Ashgate Publishing, 2008)
at i [Sloth-Nielsen, Children’s Rights in Africa].
5
Ibid at iv.
6
Ibid at i.
7
See Robert Kwame Ame, "The Rights of Children in Conflict with the Law in Ghana" (2011) 19:2 Intl J Child
Rts 271.
8
See Esmeranda Manful & Saka E Manful, "Child welfare in Ghana: The relevance of children's rights in practice"
(2014) 14:3 J Soc Work. For further explanation of this phenomenon, see also Franklin E Zimring, Maximo
Langer & David S Tanenhaus, eds, Juvenile Justice in Global Perspective (New York: New York University
Press, 2015) at 3.
4

JUVENILE JUSTICE IN AFRICA
At the ground level, within juvenile justice systems that more or less comply with the baseline
requirements of the CRC, evidence suggests that children are still living in degrading and
dangerous prison conditions.9 In 2008, the populations of imprisoned children in a number of
African countries were reported as a percentage of the overall prison population: 1.3% in
Ghana; 5.5% in Namibia; and 2.4% in Burkina Faso.10 In real numbers, this represents
anywhere from just under 100 children to several hundred children, residing among adults in
these prisons.11 The full scope of the problem is not known, nor is the actual number of affected
children.
Julia Sloth-Nielsen, an expert on child justice who sits on the African Committee of
Experts on the Rights and Welfare of the Child (ACERWC), describes the difficulty of
accurately accounting for the number of children in African prisons.12 She gives four reasons
for this difficulty: (1) the absence of birth certificates; (2) police coercion of those under 18 to
lie about their age in reports; (3) the lack of an organized system to account for prisoners in
general; and (4) reliance on media reports and NGOs to physically account for imprisoned
children. Some states have established youth detention centers within prisons.13 However, these
centers tend to invest insufficient resources to ensure appropriate handling of youth inmates.14
The fact that in some countries there is a lack of specialized personnel dealing with at-risk
children and youth means that, while child-centered in theory, these detention centers are often
set up to fail as a result of ineffective and under-resourced implementation. Additionally, it is
worth noting that while many, if not most, children in Africa who end up in prison arrive there

9

This claim is based on the personal experience of one of the authors who spent ten (10) weeks in Ghana in 2015,
learning from local children’s rights advocates who have observed prison conditions.
10
Julia Sloth-Nielsen, "Children in African Prisons" in Jeremy Sarkin, ed, Human Rights in African Prisons, 1st
ed (Cape Town: HRSC Press, 2008) 117.
11
Ibid.
12
For an alternative but supportive account of the difficulty and importance of empirical verification in reformed
countries, see Frieder Dünkel, “Juvenile Justice and Crime Policy in Europe” in Zimring et al, supra note 8 at 18.
13
Penal Reform International, Global Prison Trends, 2016 (United Kingdom: Penal Reform International, 2016)
at 5, online: <cdn.penalreform.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/05/Global_prison_trends_report_2016.pdf>.
14
Ibid, “Prison Staff: Overworked and Underpaid?” Pull-Out Section at 1-7.
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as a result of a legal process of some kind—usually criminal prosecution—there are also reports
in some countries, for example, of street children being picked up off the street, intimidated,
and beaten by police officers and sometimes put in jail cells among the adult population.15
Reports of such abuse, though underreported and difficult to track, are too egregious to
ignore.16 Examples like this mean that the number of child prisoners is likely higher than
reported, possibly considerably so, especially if incidences of unreported and misclassified
detentions are widespread.
In this article, we outline a strand of literature that sheds skeptical light on legislative,
statutory, and treaty-based efforts to promote the juvenile justice systems of sub-Saharan Africa
based on international human rights norms. This argument implies a challenge to the human
rights movement, which has hinged children’s rights in Africa on implementation and
enforcement of the CRC and other international instruments as a key driver. For a number of
reasons to be articulated in the parts below, these claims deserve to be put to the test.17 In the
next part, we review a critical perspective in the international human rights law literature, which
provides the analytical frame to assess whether international legal instruments are worth
pursuing and what their limitations might be. We argue that the international children’s rights
movement, like any well-intentioned movement for progress, can actually fail the goals that it
seeks to achieve while purporting to do the opposite.

15

One of the authors was in attendance during a training provided by Defense for Children International (DCI) in
Ghana in June 2015, that addressed this very concern. DCI was educating teachers and other community leaders
about the importance of understanding children’s initial mistrust of police officers in cities such as Kumasi.
16
See e.g. Human Rights Watch, Where Do You Want Us to Go?: Abuses against Street Children in Uganda (17
July 2014), online: < www.hrw.org/report/2014/07/17/where-do-you-want-us-go/abuses-against-street-childrenuganda>; Nambile Cumber & Joyce Mahlako Tsoka-Gwegweni, “The Health Profile of Street Children in Africa:
A Literature Review” (2015) 6:2 J Pub Health Africa 566.
17
This is especially true if the goal is, as we argue, to “remember the children.”

JUVENILE JUSTICE IN AFRICA
II. AN ETHICAL FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYZING JUVENILE JUSTICE IN SUBSAHARAN AFRICA
There is no shortage of good intentions in the international human rights movement. However,
developing an ethical framework for analyzing children’s rights as they pertain to juvenile
justice requires a healthy amount of critical reflection. This is because, as Makau Mutua argues,
“the globalization of human rights fits a historical pattern in which all high morality comes
from the West as a civilizing agent against lower forms of civilization in the rest of the world.”18
Indeed, in the early 2000s, there was a proliferation of skeptical scholarship, including Third
World Approaches to International Law (TWAIL), offering sobering critiques of globalization
generally and the globalization of human rights through international law specifically.19
Amongst the sceptics is David Kennedy. In The Dark Sides of Virtue: Reassessing
International Humanitarianism,20 Kennedy examines the growth of international campaigns to
protect refugees, promote economic development, regulate the conduct of war, and promote
human rights (including children’s rights). Writing as a believer in the goals of international
humanitarianism, he gives voice to the disappointments of a faith betrayed. By casting global
humanitarianism as an exercise in new forms of power, he demonstrates how, unavoidably,
even the most well-intentioned projects can create as many problems as they solve.
Kennedy produces an inventory of the unforeseen consequences, blind spots, and biases
of humanitarian work. He explores the mix of altruism, self-doubt, self-congratulation, and
simple disorientation that accompany efforts to bring humanitarian commitments to foreign
settings, and calls for international practice that is more self-critical than self-congratulatory,

Makau Matua, “Savages, Victims, and Saviors: The Metaphor of Human Rights” (2001) 42 Harvard Intl LJ
201.
19
See Antony Anghie & BS Chimni, “Third World Approaches to International Law and Individual Responsibility
in Internal Conflicts” (2003) 2 Chinese J Intl L 77; Makau Mutua, “What is TWAIL” (2000) 94 Am Soc Intl L
31; Opeluwa Adetoro Badaru, “Examining the Utility of Third World Approaches to International Law for
International Human Rights Law” (2008) 10:4 Intl Community L Rev 379; BS Chimni, “Third World Approaches
to International Law: A Manifesto” (2006) 8:1 Intl Community L Rev 3.
20
David Kennedy, The Dark Sides of Virtue: Reassessing International Humanitarianism (Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press, 2004) at 3-35.
18
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more humane than humanitarian, more focused on truths than on rights, and more mindful of
what is wrong with “us” rather than with “them”. Kennedy also reminds of the importance of
always being aware that Western humanitarianism can do harm, even with good intentions, and
sometimes, especially with good intentions.
We have summarized Kennedy’s checklist of critique into three broad categories: (1)
The Implicit Political Nature of International Human Rights Law (“IHRL”); (2) The Exclusion
of Distributional Justice in IHRL; and (3) The Problematic Discourse of IHRL. In what follows,
we provide a brief explanation for grouping Kennedy’s checklist items together under these
categories, and apply these critiques to the children’s rights movement, the development of
domesticated juvenile justice reforms, and some of the legal instruments pertaining to the
detainment of children within the African context. Before delving into these three sections and
analyzing the way children’s rights, juvenile justice, and legislation regulating the
imprisonment of children may (or may not) be implicated by the Kennedy critique, it is worth
noting that these categories are not intended to each stand on their own. Rather, they should be
read as integrated and interrelated. Each is a thread in the web of problems identified as
stemming from the international human rights movement.

III. THE IMPLICIT POLITICAL NATURE OF IHRL
This category encompasses four of Kennedy’s critiques. These distil the argument that IHRL,
despite its universal, supposedly objective, apolitical, and “colorless” application and
implementation, is in fact political, not just on a professional level and on a personal level, but
also at the state level. Entrenching international human rights acts have political consequences
for countries that take on this Western philosophy. He argues that, because human rights
originate and give voice to the expression of an ethics and political practice of Western
eighteenth to twentieth century liberalism, there are certain assumptions that bias the practice

JUVENILE JUSTICE IN AFRICA
of IHRL. He further argues that the human rights movement strengthens bad international
governance and that it can lead to misguided politics in particular contexts.21 We will focus
here on Kennedy’s concern beyond the simple objection that human rights discourse is rooted
in Western-dominated normativity and priorities. Instead, we focus on a more specific critique
with practical implications – i.e. the accusation that human rights reflect cultural biases rooted
in the anxieties and priorities to emerge from the West’s own troubled history. By this account,
the human rights movement is structured as primarily individualistic and secular, strangely
detached from the way many people live their lives, in complex and pluralist conceptions of
the good life. Thus, the human rights movement is viewed as inadequate because it fails to
integrate normative concepts related to spirituality, community, ancestry and group identity,
and creativity, all while pretending to be objective and universal.22
One way in which this critique is relevant to the children’s rights movement in Africa
is evidenced by the divergent philosophies underpinning the CRC and the ACRWC. At a
practical level, both treaties emphasize the importance of the “best interests of the child”
(BIOC), a highly individualistic standard that no doubt means different things to different
people and communities. Aside from the centrality of BIOC, the Conventions could not be
more different in spirit, reflecting entirely different conceptions of the social contract. The
Western approach to the social contract (as articulated in the writings of Hobbes, Locke,
Rousseau, Kant, Rawls, and others) only refers to the moral obligations of “rational people”—

21

CRC, supra note 1, arts 30-35.
This critique of the Western-washed human rights movement is still alive and well. However, many African
authors now argue that human rights are African, just as much as they are Western or white. See e.g. Basil
Ugochukwu, “Unpacking the Universal: African Human Rights Philosophy in Chinua Achebe’s Things Fall
Apart” in Oche Onazi, ed, African Legal Theory and Contemporary Problems: Critical Essays (Dordrecht:
Springer Netherlands, 2013) 199.
22
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i.e. adults.23 In intra-African cultures24 and normative philosophies, the child has both rights
and obligations towards parents and community, and is raised with an awareness of these
obligations.25 In this sense, international human rights present a challenge to pluralist African
conceptions of the child. Afua Twum-Danso Imoh discusses the interconnection of children’s
rights and duties in the Ghanaian context: “Children have the right to be obedient. Children
have the right to respect parents and all elderly people in the community. Children have the
responsibility to respect elders and do what is right”.26 The difference, however, is that in the
African context, there is a more explicit adoption of this balancing between rights and
obligations, and a prioritization of communal and community interests in ways that western
liberalism may not tolerate. These differences, when understood through social context and a
frame of normative pluralism, are not necessarily accompanied by ranking. Rather, it reflects
different global approaches to balancing collective and individual roles in society.
The two Conventions thus embody and reflect different approaches to the status of
children and the scope and content of their rights due to the underlying philosophical and social
differences discussed above. The ACRWC likely reflects a more accurate picture of the
aggregate or consensus of intra-African beliefs and value systems. This raises the question,
why is it that more African states have adopted the CRC than the African Charter? We think
that at least part of the answer lies in the implicit political nature of IHRL. First, the ratification
of an international treaty, such as the CRC, is a political act. In the case of developing countries
dependent on foreign aid and investment, being seen to embrace the values of the dominant

23

For a thorough and critical reflection of personhood as conceived by Nigerian philosopher Ifeyani Menkiti and
Western philosopher Immanuel Kant, see Katrin Flikschuh, “The Arc of Personhood: Menkiti and Kant on
Becoming and Being a person” (2016) 2:3 J Am Philosophical Assoc 437.
24
The term intra-African culture is used here to be distinguished from a homogenous “African culture” that has
been often referenced in the literature, and that we recognize as being problematic. The term “intra-African
culture” reflects the varied cultures we recognize within the continent and within each African nation, akin to the
way in which “Western culture” refers to the diverse cultural spectrum in Western countries, from European to
North American nations.
25
See Afua Twum-Danso Imoh, "Searching for a Middle Ground in Children's Rights in Ghana" (2011) 10:3 J
Hum Rts at 388.
26
Ibid at 384.

JUVENILE JUSTICE IN AFRICA
West with respect to the treatment of children could improve a country’s reputation globally.
Indeed, the perception of modernizing or developing a country by aligning with the norms of
international human rights may be viewed as a positive move that will garner respect in the
international community and open the door to economic and political cooperation. This
international perception matters to all leaders, but it may matter in particular ways to leaders
of fractious or fragile African states in efforts to secure legitimacy, stability, and prosperity.
The suggestion that their global reputation, perception, and evaluation motivates
ratification of international human rights treaties in Africa is no reason to reject ratification
itself. However, it is good reason to begin an analysis of state behavior in this regard with
skepticism, and to evaluate pragmatically the value of ratification, beyond the symbolic
assurances it provides to Western donors and other actors. On the other hand, it may very well
be that some positive, practical consequences flow from ratifying international instruments.
Another way of viewing the political dimension of the domestication of international
treaties is to see whether there are political consequences stemming from the act of
(non)ratification. For instance, in adopting the Juvenile Justice Act (2003), Ghana ratified and
entrenched the relevant sections of the CRC.27 The question that remains open is whether it has
effectively implemented the law in a way that materially improves the conditions of children
in the country. Top-down, legislative approaches are seldom successful at effecting meaningful
social change when the values and practices of the population do not align with the new norms,
or where knowledge about new norms is low. In a study of Ghana by Esmeranda Manful and
Saka E. Manful, the authors found that there is a great disparity between the legislators’ views
and experiences of children’s rights and the childcare providers’ beliefs regarding the CRC.28
The caregivers are tasked with the practical realization of the CRC’s assurances through their

Godfrey Odongo, “The Impact of International Law on Children’s Rights on Juvenile Justice Law Reform in
the African context” in Sloth-Nielsen, Children’s Rights in Africa, supra note 4 at 121.
28
Manful & Manful, supra note 8 at 323-325.
27
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daily dealings with children. The caregivers in the study were very skeptical and dismissive of
the CRC, and were found to vastly misunderstand its purpose. They believed erroneously that
it meant child participation and autonomy, with which they generally disagreed. One caregiver
stated, “Children’s rights, allowing children to be involved in every issue is a ‘white man’s’
idea; it has nothing to do with us’”.29 Even the legislators expressed some skepticism towards
the Convention, claiming, “‘. . . Ghana wants to be seen by the whole world that it is doing
well so when it comes to signing Conventions we sign. You know so that we would be in the
good books of the international community.’”30
One possible solution to this problem is to increase the transparency of government
leaders about their motivations for signing international conventions, along with a detailed plan
of implementation that they must be held accountable to see through. 31 The CRC Committee
is responsible for considering reports from all the signing countries. Jaap E. Doek claims that:
[t]his may seem to be an exercise in moving paperwork, but experiences have taught us
that it is much more than that. The preparation of the report requires, given the broad
content of the CRC, the involvement of many ministries and other governmental
bodies….In addition, the NGOs in many countries submit their own reports...to the
CRC Committee. These reports are often the work of close cooperation between the
various specialized NGOs in the country via the establishment of a national forum or
coalition of NGOs. Finally, a number of specialized UN agencies, in particular
UNICEF, submit their reports on the country to the Committee.32
There is thus some hope that international accountability mechanisms like the CRC Committee
reports will have some effect, though it is impossible to infer with certainty the reasons for a
failure to comply. In fact, it is known that many states fail to comply with implementation of

29

Ibid at 323.
Ibid at 322.
31
As an attendee pointed out during our discussion at the conference, the relationship between transparency and
accountability is not always causal, as one might expect. For a discussion of the possible frameworks that
transparency and accountability may operate within, and how this affects the relationship between the two
mechanisms, whose common goal is to publicize state action and inaction, see Jonathan Fox, “The Uncertain
Relationship between Transparency and Accountability” (2007) 17:4/5 Development in Prac 663.
32
Jaap E Doek, "Overview: The Protection of Children's Rights and the United Nations Convention on the Rights
of the Child: Achievements and Challenges" (2003) 22:2 St Louis U Pub L Rev 235 at 239.
30
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international obligations due to significant lack of resources.33 We address this issue in the next
section.

IV. THE EXCLUSION OF DISTRIBUTIONAL JUSTICE IN IHRL
In this section, we have combined two of Kennedy’s checklist items. The first is the notion that
IHRL views both the problem and the solution too narrowly.34 The second is the assertion that
the system of international human rights law is more likely to produce and excuse violations
than to prevent and remedy them.35 Both critiques drive at the main practical pitfall of human
rights law, which is that it does not properly engage institutions capable of distributional justice.
In other words, international human rights are premised on the false notion that more law will
produce greater access to justice, without an accompanying ability to change the underlying
economic conditions. One cannot expect children’s rights to be realized within a country that
lacks the ability to provide basic needs, proper educational institutions, and fair economic
distribution. The prohibition on child labor means little when child labor is the only way for a
family to survive. Punishing those who employ children does nothing to improve the
underlying conditions that produce the supply of child labor. Punishing employers and
removing children from their families to prevent them from working may actually produce, on
the whole, more harm than is caused by child labor.
Kennedy’s critique remains relevant, as financial inequality has become one of the most
pressing issues globally and locally. Scholars agree that, while political and civil rights have
garnered considerable international attention, economic, social, and cultural rights have lagged

Ibid at 251. “Poverty reduction and elimination should be given the highest priority. However, this does not
mean that States should not try to make as much progress as possible in achieving the goals set in the WFFC,
including improving protection of children against commercial sexual exploitation, abuse in the family,
institutions, and on the streets. Many things that contribute to respect for the rights and dignity of the child can be
achieved with little money. Poverty cannot be used as an excuse for doing nothing.”
34
CRC, supra note 1, art 10-13.
35
Ibid, arts 24-26.
33
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and floundered.36 This has been a shortcoming of the international human rights movement to
the extent that social and economic conditions largely determine the value and utility of
political rights.
One of the present authors spent the summer of 2015 working with Defense for Children
International (DCI) in Ghana. Engaging in local human rights outreach and education, DCI
legal interns were instructed not to encourage local children to stop working. Indeed,
notwithstanding the CRC consensus, the practical reality on the ground was that child labor is
so important to local households that it would be wrong to disrupt this system of family income
generation, however flawed it might be. It was plainly evident to the experts on the ground that
a strong application of human rights legal principles would not improve the lives of those
families who rely on child labor to survive and in fact could quite possibly make their lives
considerably worse.
Consequently, instead of pushing for immediate and full implementation of the rights
guaranteed by the CRC, DCI’s advocates advised children on how to negotiate with their
parents to gain a lighter workload, limit hours of work to only after school, and to set aside
time for homework. This strategy involved tolerating CRC violations in the pragmatic interest
of improving the material conditions for child laborers without disrupting the fragile social and
economic framework for family and community survival. DCI had to be realistic and modest
about what impact it could have on the ground. While the organization’s mission statement
adopts the CRC approach to children’s rights (rather than that of the ACRWC) the practical
reality is that the CRC’s absence of integrated economic rights means that the lived enjoyment
of political rights is wafer thin for those enduring social and economic disadvantage. Because
DCI offers no economic incentives for compliance with CRC norms, it lacks the ability to

36

See e.g. Scott Leckie & Anne Gallagher, eds, Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: A Legal Resource Guide
(Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2011).
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radically transform most of Ghanaian society. Instead, it offers children connections to human
rights lawyers, family lawyers, the police, and other services, to help increase their bargaining
power at home and at work. This has the effect of empowering children, but not necessarily in
the manner envisioned by the CRC.
Considering the global situation as a whole, what human rights discourse seems to have
ultimately accomplished for children is not economic justice, but rather some form of increased
political and social recognition. Children are now universally accepted as rights-bearing
individuals. They have achieved, as it were, an increased acknowledgement of their legal
personhood. Additionally, even though economic rights are not yet positively enforced, cultural
and social rights are being realized through the pragmatic efforts of NGOs like DCI, working
within the inherent contradictions of the international human rights movement.37 As Kennedy,
emphasizes, pragmatism is the necessary approach to advancing human interests through
human rights. In that sense, the CRC helped change the relationship between children and their
elders, and between children and the state, opening the door to various forms of rights claiming,
including via negotiations with their parents.

V. THE PROBLEMATIC DISCOURSE OF IHRL
Kennedy argues that human rights discourse is riddled with problems. We include three items
from Kennedy’s original checklist under the category of the discourse problem:38 (1) that
human rights discourse occupies the field of emancipatory possibility;39 (2) that it both

37

This was exemplified by the means of which social workers at DCI would teach young women about abstinence
and sexuality. There was no attempt to tell them not to believe in their religion (whether Muslim or Christian),
but the workers used their faith as motivation to withhold sex before marriage. They also incited fear in the young
women, explaining how horribly painful an abortion would be. While not necessarily a feminist approach, it was
an effective approach for driving home the point to young girls in a way that was culturally sensitive and ageappropriate.
38
We will only address the first and third item in this short paper.
39
CRC, supra note 1, arts 8-10.
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generalizes and particularizes too much;40 and (3) that it promises more than it can deliver.41
These critiques are concerned with dangers in the way we use human rights language — i.e.
the jargon, assumptions, and underlying philosophy. The core philosophy of human rights
discourse rests on notions of objectivity and universality that are but an abstract ideal.
Pragmatic considerations tend to matter, as we have shown in the previous sections of this
paper. They certainly matter for imprisoned children. When the gap between law on paper and
enforcement is deep, public confidence in the legislation can be undermined. The risk is that
adopting laws that are doomed to disappoint due to ineffective enforcement is precisely what
gives rise to human rights skepticism and disillusionment in the first place, as law reform
appears to be a form of public relations rather than an expression of deep enough political or
legal commitment.42 This general disillusionment may also provide an additional explanation
for the preference for the CRC over the African Charter in the children’s rights context.
Responding to Kennedy’s critique about human rights occupying the field of
emancipatory possibility, Ann Skelton sketches the penal history of pre-colonial Africa and
discusses the pluralist approaches to crime and punishment. Before colonialism, it turns out,
there was no punishment of imprisonment.43 The harshest punishments would result in physical
lashings and beatings, and the community would collectively set the punishment, with input
from the victim and their family, from the perpetrator and their family, and from any other
interested party in the community.44 However, with colonialism, imprisonment became a norm
in many African countries. Colonial liberation did not bring an immediate return to indigenous

40

Ibid, art 13-17.
Ibid, art 21-24.
42
See Frédéric Mégret, "Where Does the Critique of International Human Rights Stand? An Exploration in 18
Vignettes" in JM Beneyto & David Kennedy, eds, New Approaches to International Law: the European and the
American Experiences (Hague, The Netherlands: TMC Asser Press, 2012) 3.
43
Ann Skelton, "Freedom in the Making: Juvenile Justice in South Africa" in Zimring et al, supra note 8 at 328.
Skelton claims that “[p]rior to colonization, there was no imprisonment or institutionalization. Crimes were treated
as wrongs between individuals and families, to be solved in ways that promoted harmony and well-being in
society. Harsher punishment such as corporal punishment or banishment was meted out for serious crimes.”
44
Ibid.
41
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legal traditions. On the contrary, post-colonial leaders tended to replicate the values, structures,
policies and institutional practices of the former colonial authority. Questions of authenticity
and authority are muddled. Domestic penal codes and international human rights both cast
corporal punishment as torture, while condoning imprisoning convicted persons. Skelton notes
that the “African customary approach to children’s wrongdoing was replaced by a far more
punitive form of justice.”45 Trends towards normative pluralism and rediscovery of indigenous
legal tradition, however, have been converging with political interest in rehabilitation and
diversion in criminal justice to have set the stage for a return to traditional African approaches
to punishment. These traditions are increasingly gaining traction internationally as
emancipatory, despite the fact that the discourse of “rights” takes a back seat to a discourse of
discovery and borrowing from the local history in which these conflicts continue.46
The idea that human rights discourse promises more than it can deliver can result in
heightening the precariousness of imprisoned children. The nature of the discourse creates a
reliance on legal professionals and enforcers who become the knowledge-holders of right and
wrong, thus alienating communities from their own issues and from the vocabulary of their
own governance. In the children’s rights context, it is often pointed out that the language of the
CRC is inaccessible and improperly consulted by children themselves.47 This makes children
vulnerable, as they end up relying on adults in authority—often those with direct interests in
maintaining the subordination of children. The rights discourse furthermore promises a
supportive international community. Kennedy claims this is nothing more than a fantasy.48
Interference of Western countries in African countries, for instance, is not neutral. Rather, it is
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encouraged, and nations who ratify human rights treaties such as the CRC often find there is
little to no international support.49 The human rights movement may itself appear to be
redemptive —“as if doing something for human rights was, in and of itself, doing something
against evil”50, though, as we have argued in this paper, such is not necessarily the case.

VI. CONCLUSION
This paper has adopted the frame of Kennedy’s general critique of international
humanitarianism and applied it to the issue of children’s rights in Sub-Saharan Africa. In so
doing, we have canvassed the development of juvenile justice in the region and observe that
the critique applies in several key respects. We found that the cracks in the notion of
universality still exist upon examination of the practical implications of treaty rights in local
contexts. We have drawn attention to a few examples—anecdotal and statistical evidence—
that tend to support the Kennedy critique of international human rights mobilization. By
contrasting the CRC both with practices on the ground and with a regional human rights
instrument, we have demonstrated the inconsistent messaging with respect to the content of
children’s rights in Africa. It is likely that Kennedy’s concern about over-promising and underdelivering is evident in this confusion over the status and rights of children in the African
political and social context, notwithstanding the near universal consensus on the CRC. In the
area of juvenile justice, the stakes are highest and the need for clarity about the rights of
children is most pressing. Based on our admittedly cursory overview of the facts and literature,
we conclude that children engaged in the criminal justice systems of a number of African states
cannot, at present, expect the promises of international human rights to be fully and manifestly
evident in their lives despite the apparent embrace of fundamental children’s rights by the state.
This paradox deserves further study and sustained attention.
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